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Abstract
Drawing on interviews conducted in Brussels, Dakar and Accra between September
2017–March 2018, this paper discusses the responses of domestic policy actors to
the EU’s migration policy proposals in the two West African countries of Senegal and
Ghana. EU-African cooperation in migration is mediated by the domestic context
that the EU’s migration agenda is ‘received’ in, and the preferences and responses of
policy communities in the countries that are the intended recipients of the EU’s
governance approach. While existing studies have examined preference formation on
the part of European actors in the EU’s external migration agenda, the preferences and
agency of African actors and how these shape the EU’s external migration governance
remain under-examined. Looking primarily at domestic contestation in the area of
returns and readmission, this paper demonstrates that the preferences of policy actors
in the receiving country are formed in a shifting domestic context and have an impact
in determining the ability of the EU to achieve its aims and preferred governance
strategy. In addition, it is shown that organisational and bureaucratic dynamics can
influence cooperation outcomes.
Keywords: Migration, West Africa, EU, Policy, Sociological institutionalism,
Organisational sociology, Externalisation, Senegal, Ghana
Introduction
The growing literature on the EU’s migration policy ‘externalisation’ in non-EU coun-
tries has given key insights into the outcomes of cooperation in migration, as well as
processes of policy convergence in line with an EU agenda in migration. Such scholar-
ship has demonstrated the processes by which the EU and its Member States strive to
implement policies and frameworks that promote the governing of EU borders outside
of its actual borders and jurisdiction (Andersson, 2014; Aubarell, Zapata-Barrero, &
Aragall, 2009; Betts, 2011; Boswell, 2003; Lavenex & Uçarer, 2004; Samers, 2004). Yet,
the picture that emerges is one where the EU is sometimes, but not always, successful
in achieving its policy preferences in negotiation with non-EU partner countries, as
recent historical efforts to converge third countries’ migration policies in line with the
EU agenda have seen mixed results.1 The EU’s success in achieving formal migration
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1‘Third’ countries is a term used in EU documents to designate non-EU countries. I use the same term over
the course of this paper.
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cooperation in African countries has largely occurred when the aims and priorities of
African political counterparts converged with the EU’s aims; even in those instances
African countries can be seen to have implemented policies ‘à la carte’ (Wunderlich,
2010). The EU’s failure in securing a Mobility Partnership with Senegal (Chou &
Gibert, 2012; Reslow & Vink, 2015) is also evidence of a mixed track record in attaining
migration policy preferences in West Africa. The success of the EU’s pursuit of its
migration policy preferences in third countries is far from a fait accompli from the
outset: it is often dependent on factors such as the relative strategic strength of third
countries’ positions in relation to the EU, the perception of the EU as an effective actor,
and the willingness of the third country to participate in joint cooperation schemes
based on perceived cost and benefit. At the same time, the EU’s geographical and
partnership ambitions in the area of migration have continued to expand: the EU’s
Partnership Framework, proposed in 2016, builds on ‘lessons learned’ in the course of
the EU’s external migration policy implementation over the last decade. It details a
roadmap for further EU involvement in the migration governance of 16 ‘priority coun-
tries’. Of these 16 countries, 13 are located in Africa.2 The EU Emergency Trust Fund
for Africa (EUTF), an EU tool and funding mechanism introduced in November 2015,
is the financial backbone to the Partnership Framework and constitutes a major scaling
up of the EU’s migration ambitions in, primarily, sub-Saharan Africa.
Institutionalist literature has provided much of the existing scholarship on
theorising EU external migration governance and negotiation outcomes. A distinc-
tion can be made between rational choice institutionalism and sociological or con-
structivist theories on the other hand. Rational choice institutionalism examines
international negotiations from the perspective of ‘goal-seeking under constraints’
(Snidal, 2002, p.74). In a rationalist model, bargaining strategies are adapted to at-
tain preferences, where preference formation is external to the broader institutional
context that actors operate in. The rationalist approach has been widely applied in
the Europeanisation literature, which adopts a policy transfer lens and points to
eventual accession to the Union as an important incentive for cooperation with the
EU (Graziano & Vink, 2007; Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009; Schimmelfennig &
Sedelmeier, 2004; Wunderlich, 2012). Sociological institutionalism stresses the im-
portance of norms, socialisation, rules, and practices in the formation of policy and
in decision-making processes (Checkel, 2005; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998;
Katzenstein, 1984; Pollack, 2007). These perspectives point to the importance of
the ‘appropriateness’ of the proposed policy or agreement in terms of its coherence
with actors’ notions of their identities and roles, and with formal or informal rules.
Rule-guided behaviour may be unconscious but is also often a deliberate process,
where actors seek to decipher a situation and apply the appropriate norm
according to their given identities (March & Olsen, 1989; Risse, 2000). Policy-mak-
ing actors for example make decisions that are likely to reinforce their legitimacy,
rather than detract from it. Institutional norms may on the other hand constrain
the ability of policy-makers to implement wide-ranging changes (Bonjour, Ripoll
Servent, & Thielemann, 2018).
2The 16 priority countries listed: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Ghana, Côte
d’Ivoire, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan.
Mouthaan Comparative Migration Studies            (2019) 7:35 Page 2 of 20
The two logics of political action are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as actors
may for example pursue non-material goals but consequentialism (means and ends
calculations) may still underlie policy choices (Checkel, 2001). A case can therefore be
made to use both simultaneously (Börzel & Risse, 2003; Checkel, 2001; Risse, 2000).
This paper accordingly draws on institutionalist approaches to demonstrate that state
actors in policy ‘recipient’ countries can be shown to adopt both a logic of appropriate-
ness, and a logic of expected consequences, in line with existing ideas around ‘bridging’
rationalist and sociological or constructivist approaches (Thielemann, 2001; Zürn &
Checkel, 2005).
This article is positioned as follows. The formation of the EU’s external migration
policy as a result of competing actors at the national and regional level seeking to exert
their influence – and using the external ‘venue’ to do so – has been well documented
using an institutionalist lens (e.g. Guiraudon, 2000, Guiraudon, 2003, Lavenex, 1999,
Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009). In comparison, actor-centred studies in policy-‘re-
ceiving’ countries and analyses of institutional dynamics that inform policy formation
in these countries are more limited. Studies have, moreover, focused on external incen-
tives for third countries to cooperate with the EU on migration (e.g. Schimmelfennig &
Sedelmeier, 2004) or on the limits of EU institutional and political power in negotia-
tions with third countries (e.g. Hampshire, 2016). The agency of African actors and
their role in shaping migration cooperation is more commonly negated due to the
asymmetry of power dynamics between EU and African countries (El Qadim, 2015;
Van Criekinge, 2010). Power-based arguments have stressed that the negotiating power
of the EU and its Member States far exceeds that of individual African states. While
this is a generally uncontested assertion, African actors are not merely ‘passive agents’
in the EU’s external migration governance and the role of local actors in determining
migration cooperation outcomes can be significant, as a few studies have demonstrated
(notably: Van Criekinge, 2010; Paoletti, 2011; Reslow, 2012).
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. Taking the case studies of Senegal and
Ghana, two countries targeted by the EU’s external migration agenda, I first address
the ‘black box’ of preference formation among domestic political actors, looking at in-
ternal institutional influences rather than external incentives. Political actors in policy-
receiving countries may extract their legitimacy externally to the domestic sphere, or
cooperate in exchange for material incentives. This premise has formed the basis of the
EU’s ‘more for more’ approach with third countries, which has typically used condition-
ality as a means of encouraging cooperation: accordingly, development aid financing,
and visa facilitation, has hinged on third countries’ willingness to readmit their na-
tionals found in an irregular situation (Adepoju, van Noorloos, & Zoomers, 2010;
Carrera, Cassarino, El Qadim, Lahlou, & den Hertog, 2016; Den Hertog, 2016). Yet this
article proposes that actors respond to incentives and constraints at the domestic level
in equal or greater part than they respond to the EU’s migration governance approach.
Policy actors perceive socioeconomic and political costs to the EU’s migration policy
proposals and are subject to considerations and constraints that stem from party
politics, electoral pressures, media attention, public opinion and diaspora influence,
where these factors both shape and constrain action. It is furthermore shown that
domestic actors form sophisticated strategies to contest the EU’s externalisation. Such
contestation strategies emerge from longer-term experience with EU cooperation,
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whereby policy-recipient states who have experience in negotiations with the EU may
fare better than negotiation ‘newcomers’ such as Niger (Koch, Weber, & Werenfels,
2018). Secondly, this paper uses an organisational perspective to explore how domestic
actors seek to increase institutional legitimacy and capacities, and to guard competence
over migration issues. African government ministries, departments and agencies have
mandates and migration policy preferences that may differ not only with those of the
EU, but also internally. Cooperation also takes place over the long-term whereas
domestic political or organisational changes can cause a top-down reprioritisation of
policy interests and tasks, a distancing from previous policies, or a change of actors –
all of which have an impact on cooperation dynamics. Organisational dynamics within
Senegalese and Ghanaian government ministries are thus shown to have an effect on
achieving meaningful cooperation with the EU.
In proceeding, this paper addresses a geographical research gap. While sub-Saharan
African countries feature increasingly prominently on the EU’s external migration
agenda following recently introduced EU policies, frameworks and instruments that
target sub-Saharan Africa and the West African region in particular, the bulk of exist-
ing literature is on the EU ‘neighbourhood’ of North Africa (see Cassarino, 2014; De
Haas, 2008a; El Qadim, 2014; Paoletti, 2011) and Central/Eastern Europe when asses-
sing the impact of EU external governance in third countries. In the West African con-
text, empirical research on migration governance and policy formulation remains
limited – exceptions include Adam, Trauner, Jegen, and Roos (2019); Andersson
(2014); Chou and Gibert (2012); Frowd (2018); Trauner and Deimel (2013). This paper
complements these and other studies while offering a differentiated account of the pref-
erence formation of domestic actors in Senegal and Ghana.
Methodology
The analysis presented draws on research conducted in Brussels, Dakar and Accra
between September 2017 and March 2018. Thirty-one semi-structured interviews were
conducted with officials working at the EU Delegations in Dakar and Accra; Senegalese
and Ghanaian government officials working in ministries or government agencies
dealing with migration; EU project implementers (both in field offices and in Brussels);
and Senegalese and Ghanaian epistemic communities. Interviewees were selected
against the criteria of being involved in an aspect of migration policy in their day-to-
day jobs. A central aim of the selection process was to have a representation of
viewpoints from the key government ministries who deal with migration (the Ministry
of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) but to also gather perspectives from
wider policy communities: other migration policy researchers or practitioners whose
role is more commonly overlooked in the existing literature, as a focus on security and
law enforcement (and actors involved therein) often prevails.3 As such, efforts were
made to secure interviews with civil servants at other ministries dealing with aspects of
migration, migration scholars in Senegal and Ghana, and government-contracted
consultants. Interviews were conducted in English or French and were recorded and
transcribed – when recording was not possible, notes were taken during the interview.
3I employ the term ‘policy community’ in the same sense as Kingdon (2014): a community composed of
specialists in a policy area, ‘scattered both through and outside of government’ (p.117) including government
ministerial and agency officials but also academics, consultants and analysts for interest groups.
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Other interviews were conducted as part of my wider PhD research with civil society
organisations, European Commission officials, EU Member State government officials,
and migrant association representatives, and are not directly included here, although
they have informed my analysis from a broader perspective.
To gain access to Senegalese and Ghanaian government officials, it was necessary to
request formal top-down permission to conduct research within the government
ministries. The use of an introduction letter detailing my research aims and featuring a
link to my departmental profile at my university enabled me to gain access to initial
points of contact as well as my first interviewees, who would then introduce me to
other research participants within the ministry or agency. Appointments with officials
in Dakar and Accra were secured primarily by phone and frequently with the assistance
of secretarial and support staff, with emails being notably more likely to fail to deliver
or to be ignored. For interviews conducted in Brussels, email generally proved effective
as a means of securing participation. Interviews were transcribed and subsequently
coded using qualitative analysis software Atlas Ti. A thematic coding analysis approach
(Robson & McCartan, 2016, pp.467–470) was used inductively: codes were not pre-de-
termined but generated directly from the data in an initial round of coding, with codes
revised and grouped into a smaller number of themes in secondary coding. The soft-
ware’s ‘network’ function was used as a tool to map and visualise patterns, themes and
trends in the data, and to aid analysis. The analysis also draws on documentary
research and on my participation as an observer in migration stakeholder workshops,
including civil society workshops and consultations between government and civil
society in Senegal and Ghana. Documents used in the analysis of this paper include
both National Migration Policy (NMP) documents, where Ghana’s NMP is available
online and the Senegalese NMP document was obtained from the Senegalese Ministry
of Finance.
The selection of two West African countries as case studies in this research is
useful because the EU’s ability to attain its policy preferences in cooperation in this
context is more limited: accession conditionality has proven a strong incentive for
cooperation (Lavenex & Schimmelfennig, 2009) but is absent as a bargaining ‘car-
rot’ in the case of the EU’s cooperation with African states. The case study selec-
tion also mirrors the EU’s selection of West Africa as a target region for enhanced
partnership in migration. The strategic importance of Senegal as a partner in the
region is acknowledged by the European Commission and is demonstrated in re-
cent policy developments which include the selection of Senegal as one of five
‘compact’ countries (enhanced EU-third country partnership framework in migra-
tion); the recent historical efforts in targeting the Senegalese government for the
signing of a Mobility Partnership; and the status the African nation enjoys as one
of the main beneficiaries of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa since its
introduction in late 2015. Ghana makes up part of the smaller, second wave of
African countries to become eligible for financing under the EU Trust Fund, which
it became eligible for in June 2017. Ghana’s access to the Trust Fund, until re-
cently, remained more indirect than Senegal’s – while initially it could only access
funding for projects implemented in the wider region, since 2019 it is eligible for
national projects. Both Senegal and Ghana are longstanding partners of the EU and
EU Member States in migration as evidenced by several programmes that have run
Mouthaan Comparative Migration Studies            (2019) 7:35 Page 5 of 20
in each country over a long term, suggesting they each have a certain amount of
experience in negotiating with European counterparts in this area.
Historical overview and key state actors
While statistics on migration flows should be treated with caution, it has been shown
that both Senegal and Ghana are among the largest contributors of migratory flows to
Europe, next to Nigeria (De Haas, 2008b). In addition, both countries have a history as
migrant-receiving nations in the region. In the case of Senegal, the fall in the global
price of groundnut oil altered the country from an immigration to an emigration nation
after 1975 (Cross, 2013) while remittances from Senegalese migrants abroad gained in
importance in light of the 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc, and the collapse of
agricultural sectors (Cross, 2013). Despite the gradual closure of European borders and
the enforcement of entry visas into France as of 1985 and Italy as of 1990, many Sene-
galese continued to emigrate.
In the case of Ghana, the country’s relative affluence after its independence in 1957
ensured that it remained an attractive place for migrants: in particular, the development
of industry induced both rural to urban internal migration as well as sub-regional
migration to Ghana’s urban centres (Awumbila, Manuh, Quartey, Tagoe, & Bosiakoh,
2008, p.7). Similarly to Senegal, emigration picked up in the 1970s and 1980s following
an economic downturn, and migration thereafter emerged as a strategy for dealing with
economic and social challenges in the home country. At the same time, it should be
stressed that around 70% of Ghana’s international migrants reside in other ECOWAS
(Economic Community of West African States) Member States (Devillard, Bacchi, &
Noack, 2015, p.165) with migration to OECD countries a comparatively small
phenomenon.
Senegal
Of the Senegalese government ministries involved in migration policy, interviews were
conducted with the Ministry of Interior’s Air and Border Police (DPAF), the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Senegalese Abroad (MAESE), the Directorate-General for
Senegalese Abroad (DGSE) and the Directorate-General for Human Capital (DDCH)
under the Ministry of Finance.
The Senegalese Ministry of Foreign Affairs now includes the DGSE from what was
formerly a separate ministry. It is the DGSE that acts as the project implementing arm
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while it is the political unit of the ministry that
conducts diplomatic discussions with other countries on migration and that deals with
more sensitive issues that arise, such as returns. The Senegalese Ministry of Interior
has a long-standing collaboration with the EU and Frontex (the European Border and
Coast Guard Agency) where this collaboration was formed with the intention of
eliminating irregular migration from the Senegalese coastline. This has been ‘successful’
in the sense that no departures now take place from Senegalese shores, although
migration routes have merely shifted to other shores and to land routes. MAESE is also
primarily involved in managing the rights of the Senegalese diaspora abroad and
promoting their interests, together with the DGSE. Other ministries are involved in
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different aspects of migration policy. The DDCH has been placed in charge of coordin-
ating the production of Senegal’s NMP.
Ghana
Of the Ghanaian government ministries involved in migration policy, interviews were
conducted with the Ministry of Interior and the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS)
(a government agency under the umbrella of the Ministry of Interior); the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration (MoFARI); the Ministry of Employment
and Labour Relations; and the Ministry of Justice (Attorney-General’s Office).
Competency for migration issues is, as with the Senegalese government, spread
between different ministries, government departments and agencies. Within MoFARI,
efforts are aimed at maintaining good bilateral relations, and ensuring that policies are
well ‘meted out’.4 In practice, this means ensuring that the ‘comprehensive’ approach as
espoused by the EU does indeed encompass the five pillars agreed upon at the 2015
Valletta Summit, and does not focus solely on returns and readmissions. The
Multilateral Relations Bureau at MoFARI promotes the humane treatment of migrants
and seeks to ensure that benefits of migration to both sending and receiving countries
are harnessed. The Ministry of Justice deals with legal aspects of migration policy,
including advising on treaties and ensuring their alignment with existing protocols and
laws at the national and regional (ECOWAS) level. It is the Ministry of Interior that
has a longstanding collaboration with the EU and EU Member States in managing
migration, and has received substantial funding by the EU in support of capacity
building of its institutions. This is most notable in the continued stream of financing to
the GIS, which has seen the increase in size of its anti-trafficking unit; the establish-
ment of the Migration Information Bureau within GIS (an idea initially proposed by
the UK government through the EU and readily accepted by GIS); several flagship
projects in building border management capacity such as the Ghana Integrated
Migration Management Approach, which set up a Migration Information Centre in the
north Ghanaian transit town of Sunyani.5 The significant investment by the EU in
favour of GIS, and migration management activities, is noted by other ministries, who
perceive the EU’s preference in this direction.6
Preference formation: returns and readmission
A key aim of the EU and EU Member States has long been the securement of migrant
readmission agreements with third countries, and as a result this has formed a core part
of the EU’s migration dialogue with many African countries. The importance accorded
by the EU to securing a higher rate of return is reasserted in the 2016 Partnership
Framework where it is expressly stated that the ‘paramount priority is to achieve fast
and operational returns’ whether through formal readmission agreements or other – in-
formal – arrangements (European Commission, 2016, p.7). Despite past EU and EU
Member State efforts, there has been little progress in securing readmission agreements
with African states. Readmission agreements remain a largely unpopular political
choice for state actors in Senegal and Ghana, for reasons discussed in this section; yet,
4Interview with senior official at MoFARI, Europe Bureau, Accra. 23 February 2018.
5Interview at GIS, Accra, 9 March 2018.
6Interview with EU Desk Officer at MoFARI, Accra, 23 February 2018.
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returns do take place and policymakers are not averse to returns in all cases. There is
therefore a need to theorise in more detail the preferences of actors. The graphs below
detail the total number of return orders issued by EU Member States to presumed
Senegalese and Ghanaian irregular migrants in the years 2011–2018 (Fig. 1) and the
percentage of these return orders carried out (Fig. 2). Senegalese migrants have been
the subject of return orders in greater numbers than Ghanaians. The rate of return has
remained fairly constant, with the percentage of return orders carried out varying between
8 and 15% for Senegal, and a slightly higher rate of 18–34% for Ghana.
Socioeconomic and political costs
Remittances and reintegration
While encouraging the return of the diaspora to contribute to national development
has formed a part of government migration policy in both countries, Senegalese and
Ghanaian state actors are reluctant to accept ‘involuntary’ returns and readmission for
political reasons, while also considering the domestic socioeconomic implications.
From an economic perspective, the cost of accepting involuntary (or ‘forced’) returns
is twofold. The first constitutes the immediate loss of remittances, while remittances
make up an important part of GDP in both Senegal and Ghana. The ‘economic weight’
of Senegalese abroad is, for instance, considered more important to the Senegalese state
than external (development) aid.7 Many households depend on migrant remittances for
daily expenses, where a Senegalese DGSE official observed that if emigrants did not
remit, it would be ‘a disaster’.8 The secondary economic impact stems from challenges
in reintegrating returnees. Presently, neither Senegal nor Ghana has the capacity to
adequately reintegrate returnees. The Senegalese NMP notes the lack of a national
mechanism to deal with ‘involuntary returns’ with regard to the distinct needs of
forcibly returned migrants, which includes psychological, social, legal and financial sup-
port (Senegalese NMP: Ministry of Finance of Senegal, 2018). Ghanaian officials equally
note the ‘abrupt return’ of Ghanaians between 2011 and 2012 posed ‘significant chal-
lenges’ regarding reintegration (Ghanaian NMP: Ministry of Interior of Ghana, 2016,
p.44). The abrupt nature of forced returns removes the agency migrants have regarding
the timing of their return journey. Studies on return migration and development have
largely shown that migrants need time to save while abroad in order to build a house
or start a business on their return or they are more likely to become dependent on fam-
ily members (Åkesson, 2011; Cross, 2013). Returnees who do not reintegrate socially
and economically are likely to become a burden to the state, where a Ghanaian official
from the Bureau of Diaspora Affairs cited unemployment and increasing crime rates as
consequences that would need to be managed by the state.9
State mechanisms to support returnees, to the extent that these exist, focus largely
on voluntary returns – such as the Fonds d’Appui à l’Investissement des Sénégalais de
l’Extérieur programme in Senegal, where eligibility to accessing project funding is lim-
ited to Senegalese abroad who have a legal immigration status in their host country,
and who can demonstrate business acumen (see MAESE, 2016). This chimes with
broader findings in the literature that African states’ diaspora policy tends to profile the
7Interview at EU Delegation, Dakar, 13 October 2017.
8Interview at DGSE, Dakar, 17 October 2017.
9Interview at Diaspora Bureau, Office of the President, 20 February 2018.
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‘ideal migrant returnee’ as resourceful, experienced and entrepreneurial (Sinatti, 2018,
p.2; Naudé, Siegel, & Marchand, 2017). Migrants who are forcibly returned do not ne-
cessarily reflect this profile, and as such state reintegration mechanisms are currently
poorly matched with the specific needs of forced returnees. The Senegalese state has,
since the 1980s, also operated Bureaux d’Accueil et d’Orientation des Sénégalais de
l’Extérieur (BAOS) which are offices intended to provide information and advice to re-
turnees, including guiding returnees towards funding opportunities. Yet, the BAOS re-
main understaffed and underfunded, as noted by the Senegalese NMP (Ministry of
Finance of Senegal, 2018, p.88). Civil society organisations working with returnees have
observed that returnees are also largely unaware of the existence of these support
Fig. 1 Return orders issued by country of citizenship; EU total. Source: Eurostat, 2018a (adapted from
dataset [migr_eiord])
Fig. 2 Percentage of return orders carried out to third countries (beyond EU borders). Source: Eurostat,
2018b (adapted from datasets [migr_eiord] and [migr_eirtn])
Mouthaan Comparative Migration Studies            (2019) 7:35 Page 9 of 20
mechanisms. Despite the increased politicisation surrounding returns and the increase
in the overall number of return programmes since 2005, return migration has been lit-
tle studied or systematically analysed by policymakers, where this research gap is par-
ticularly noticeable in the African context (Black & King, 2004; Flahaux & Kabbanji,
2013; Ghosh, 2000). This adds to the uncertainty of managing return and reintegration
in a way that effectively mediates negative social externalities. EU countries have pol-
icies regarding provisions for reintegration support that vary widely – some are viewed
more favourably, such as in the case of Swiss-Senegalese cooperation on returns and re-
integration implemented by the DGSE, which is cited as a preferred model for cooper-
ation on return by MAESE’s diplomatic branch.10 An interviewee at the Ghanaian
MoFARI also observed that the EUTF has since recently ensured Ghanaian deportees
are given a stipend towards their reintegration.11 Since 2017, the EUTF has imple-
mented projects in Senegal and Ghana which provide funds for reintegrating returnees
(see e.g. European Commission, 2017).
Public opinion
State actors are equally wary of negative public opinion, where media scrutiny sur-
rounding returns disincentivises cooperation on returns with European countries. On
the one hand, this has led to more informal cooperation on returns in the form of
‘non-standard’ arrangements in place of formal agreements that are less visible to both
the European and African public (Cassarino, 2007). Both Senegal and Ghana are demo-
cratic states, ensuring political actors are cautious when dealing with contentious is-
sues, given the possibility rival political parties will make use of negative public
sentiment in election campaigns. Citing political ramifications, a senior official at the
Migration Unit of the Ministry of Interior of Ghana noted that public opinion deter-
mined the ministry’s unwillingness to be seen to be cooperating with the EU regarding
identification missions to facilitate returns.12 In both countries the relationship between
policy communities and the media on the topic of migration is strained. There is a per-
ception among both state and non-state policy actors that journalists demonstrate a
poor grasp of migration concepts that affects reporting quality on migration issues,
with a tendency to reproduce news stories and media narratives from Northern coun-
tries with little or no added analytical scrutiny or context.13 Policy communities in both
countries have sought to address this by providing training to journalists in the hope to
sensitise the media on various aspects of migration issues, and to encourage more
favourable and objective reporting.
In addition to voters at home, the diaspora also constitute an increasingly powerful voice
in state affairs and governance. In Senegal, a legislative change took place in 2017 whereby
15 additional seats were added to the National Assembly, earmarked for members of the
diaspora. This has made the country a relative exception in the region, as few other African
states have facilitated the political empowerment of their diaspora through direct parliamen-
tary representation. Although the diaspora represent less than 5% of the electorate,
Senegalese political parties run election campaigns advancing propositions that cater to the
10Interview at MAESE, Dakar, 10 November 2017.
11Interview, MoFARI, Europe Desk, Accra, 23 February 2018.
12Interview at Ministry of Interior, Accra, 23 February 2018.
13Interview at CMS, University of Ghana, Accra, 20 February 2018.
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diaspora; the Senegalese diaspora are also perceived as ‘grands électeurs’ (influential voters) to
the extent that they are considered to influence voting behaviour at home (Maillard &
Costard, 2019). The 2019 national elections in Senegal saw a shift in the national political de-
bate as the pan-African and sovereignist discourse of candidate Ousmane Sonko proved
broadly appealing but resonated particularly strongly with the diaspora and young Senegalese
voters (Niang & Tandia, 2019). This signals that the Senegalese diaspora’s influence in the
country is not only economic in terms of remittances, but also distinctly political.14 While
Ghanaian legislation has not extended to direct political representation, a dynamic that can
be identified as of early 2017 is that the current government administration in Ghana consists
of a significant number of former members of the diaspora. These former members of the
Ghanaian diaspora had historically made both financial and ‘political contributions’ to the na-
tional political debate, from abroad, where the returnees in the current government hold key
positions in Cabinet and as ministerial directors.15 Ghana has perhaps outpaced Senegal and
indeed other African states in the scale of its charm offensive towards its diaspora, with the
introduction of a number of policies that extend rights to the diaspora (such as the ‘Right of
Abode’ law). Political parties have also set up branches in many host countries to engage with
the diaspora – and to facilitate their involvement in Ghana’s political development (Teye,
Alhassan, & Setrana, 2017, p.151). As Ghanaian and Senegalese political parties increasingly
look to engage their diaspora for economic and political reasons, this is likely to be at odds
with expanding cooperation with the EU on returns and readmission.
Returns as inappropriate
The relative domestic factors that come into play are therefore multi-faceted and
considerable. At the same time, state actors perceive the EU’s approach regarding
returns and readmissions as inappropriate. This relates to two contentions in particular:
a conflicting perspective on the appropriateness of implementing returns; and the issue
of state sovereignty, where this has crystallised on the issue of identifications.
Senegalese and Ghanaian Foreign Affairs officials have sought to counter aspects of
the EU’s migration narrative and have argued for a different understanding on
migration and returns in the following ways. Firstly, there is a desire among policy-
makers in both case studies to have the contributions of migrants in host countries
acknowledged, and a recognition in EU-African migration dialogues that migration
brings benefits to origin and host countries alike. Migration is also construed, by
Ghanaian and Senegalese policymakers, as a phenomenon linked to globalisation. Al-
though noting that ‘nobody encourages irregular migration’, an official at the Ghanaian
MoFARI stressed that migration could hardly be curbed altogether as it is a ‘human’
phenomenon; and that this position is frequently adopted as a countering narrative by
both the African Union and ECOWAS.16 Senegalese and Ghanaian policymakers fur-
thermore point to the low number of visas as being a major driver of the decision to
migrate irregularly. It is felt that an integral part of reducing irregular migration is a
corresponding increase in legal pathways, and the need for the EU to facilitate a system
of what one DGSE official dubbed ‘organised immigration’.17This is true even for
14Interview at EU Delegation, Dakar, 13 October 2017; Interview at DGSE, Dakar, 3 November 2017.
15Interview at Diaspora Bureau, Accra, 20 February 2018.
16Interview, MoFARI, Europe Desk, Accra, 23 February 2018.
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student visas and visas for business, which were perceived as being ‘deplorably’ low in
2015/2016.18
Beyond conflicting migration narratives, a point of serious contention with domestic rules
is the identification procedures of assumed Senegalese or Ghanaian migrants. Despite re-
peated efforts on the part of the EU, MAESE has not signed an agreement with the EU which
would expand cooperation on returns. Senegalese diplomatic officials perceive the return of
migrants without the explicit involvement of the Senegalese state in confirming citizenship as
unlawful, where MAESE considers identification of Senegalese abroad an area of its own jur-
isdiction, to be conducted against its own criteria.19Failing this, one issue cited is the risk of
false identifications resulting in persons of non-Senegalese citizenship being returned to
Senegal.20 The use by some EU Member States of charter flights instead of commercial
flights as a method of return is also strongly contested and viewed as unequivocally dehuma-
nising.21 The question of sovereignty emerges in relation to the use of ‘laissez passer’ by EU
Member States to return migrants: the Senegalese government determines that only ‘sauf
conduits’ issued by MAESE, following case-by-case identification missions, are legally accept-
able.22 DPAF, as part of the Ministry of Interior of Senegal, also cites sovereignty infringe-
ment in explaining its policy of refusing entry to migrants returned with a European laissez-
passer.23 These points of contestation have provided a framework for the Senegalese govern-
ment to limit cooperation on returns. MAESE’s response to EU pressure to accept returns
has been to fall back on ‘classical mechanisms of cooperation’ such as diplomacy, and where
possible to reference applicable legal frameworks.
The questions of returns and readmission of migrants to Ghana is, as with Senegal, a con-
tentious issue, although interviewees were less likely to cite sovereignty infringement as the
key issue. Rather, reference was made primarily to public perceptions as a constraint in co-
operating openly on returns. In April 2016, the Ghanaian MoFARI and Ministry of Interior
signed a Joint Declaration with EU counterparts, with Ghana signifying its willingness to ex-
pand cooperation in the matter of returns of Ghanaian citizens of irregular status in the EU
(EEAS, 2016). This was prompted by the EU’s dissatisfaction with the return rate of Ghan-
aian irregular migrants (EEAS, 2016). While the data on returns carried out (see Fig. 2) since
the signing of the agreement is far from conclusive given the short timeframe, there is as of
yet no indication that the agreement has expanded cooperation on returns. Although a spike
in the return rate can be observed for Ghana in 2017–2018 (Fig. 2), this should be interpreted
in the context of a corresponding drop in the number of return orders issued in the same
year. The Ghanaian MoFARI considers that returns should be optional, not forced, in all
cases.24 The question of both the limited number of visas for Ghanaians, and readmission co-
operation, has brought the EU-Ghana political dialogue on migration to a halt: an interviewee
from the EU Delegation in Accra commented that the finding of ‘another framework’ might
be necessary, or for the EU Member States to push for readmissions agreements bilaterally
rather than through the EU.25
17Interviews at DGSE, Dakar, November 2017.
18Interviews at DGSE, Dakar, November 2017.
19Interviews at MAESE, Dakar, October–November 2017.
20Interview, MAESE, Dakar, 10 November 2017.
21Interviews at MAESE, Dakar, November 2017.
22Interview, MAESE, Dakar, 2 November 2017.
23Interview, DPAF, Dakar, 3 November 2017.
24Interview at Diaspora Bureau, Accra, 20 February 2018.
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Exceptions – facilitating return
Where either government has stated a willingness to facilitate returns this has been done
primarily in the context of taking the humanitarian route when other intermediate political
options have failed. In particular, interviewees in the Senegalese and Ghanaian ministries
have noted that the reporting by the local media on the conditions of sub-Saharan African
migrants in Libya acted as a catalyst in spurring ministerial action in repatriating migrants
from Libya. In such cases, repatriation is viewed as the appropriate and humanitarian course
of action when the plight of Senegalese and Ghanaian migrants in Libya is in the media
spotlight, and where inaction would detract from state actors’ legitimacy. The EU’s cooper-
ation with Senegal and Ghana in the case of ‘assisted voluntary returns’ along the migration
route has therefore, in contrast to returns from Europe, been largely successful, although
the number of returns in question is of a smaller scale.
Equally, in its bilateral relations with France, Senegal has a comprehensive bilateral agree-
ment that includes readmission but also facilitation of entry for Senegalese into the French
labour market. In the case of this particular agreement, MAESE agrees in principle to co-
operate in the return of irregular migrants from France. However, it pursues this avenue
only when ‘intermediate political options’ have been exhausted.26 The agreement bestows
on the Senegalese government leeway in negotiating returns and raising objections, where
under pre-determined circumstances a detained Senegalese migrant can still claim excep-
tional leave to stay. In some cases, MAESE was able to negotiate regularisation as an alter-
native option. If negotiations for such intermediate options fail, returns are accepted as the
appropriate humanitarian course of action.
Impact on cooperation
Party politics
In both case studies, state actors have a varying interest and commitment to migration pol-
icies, and the pursuit of specific migration policy options is partly attributable to domestic
party politics and its dynamics.
Both countries have been the recipients of external funding to put in place migration policy
frameworks. In the case of Ghana, the NMP was launched in April 2016. The Ghanaian Min-
istry of Interior – the ‘owner’ of the NMP – opted to outsource the drafting of this policy to
key external partners, in particular consultants at the Centre for Migration Studies at the
University of Ghana, and with oversight from the International Organization for
Migration (IOM). From the NMP the need to establish a Diaspora Engagement Policy
was identified, as well as a Labour Migration Policy. However, political developments in
Ghana have effectively impeded the rolling out of the NMP. With the election of a new
government, the policy has seen little to no advancement in actual implementation. Inter-
viewees point to the current government’s desire to revisit and re-evaluate the NMP, and
that as a result the document has been shelved.27 One of the key bodies set out in the
document to oversee the implementation of the Policy – the Ghana National Commission
on Migration – has not taken form. The reasons for this include the shifting political con-
text and the distancing of the new party in power to the activities of the previous party; at
the same time, several actors have also noted the need for renewed external funding.28
25Interview at EU Delegation, Accra, 25 January 2018.
26Interviews at MAESE, and DGSE, Dakar, October–November 2017.
27Interviews at EU Delegation, Accra, 25 January 2018; and Diaspora Bureau, Accra, 20 February 2018.
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While it can be reasonably expected that the increased representation of members of
the Ghanaian diaspora in key positions of government will make the current govern-
ment receptive to efforts to safeguard the rights of Ghanaians abroad – and to encour-
age the investments of diaspora in Ghana’s national development – so far such
developments have not materialised. The Diaspora Engagement Policy remains unim-
plemented following the same logic that the document is largely associated with the
activities and priorities of the previous Ghanaian government. The decision to migrate
the Diaspora Bureau – formerly under MoFARI – to the Office of the President has
also effectively resulted in the drastic shrinking of the Diaspora Bureau, as a number of
staff were relocated to other ministerial areas and departments, and thus resulting in
the loss of expertise and institutional memory in this area.29
In Senegal, the current government’s discourse on the notion of ‘terre ferme’ (‘solid
ground’), which addresses the challenge of youth unemployment by supporting agricul-
tural activities in economically depressed regions, has found substantial common
ground with the EU’s approach of addressing the ‘root causes’ of irregular migration in
migrant departure zones.30 This has led to several EUTF interventions in Senegal
focusing on agriculture. Yet, civil society actors have been more pessimistic about this
political agenda when noting that the ongoing focus on agriculture is both misplaced in
relation to aspirations of the youth, and unpromising in terms of the country’s future
economic development.31
Inter-ministerial dynamics
One important feature of inter-ministerial dynamics that emerges is that they are char-
acterised by the pursuit of goals along individual ministerial lines. This is further com-
pounded by the lack of formalised and regular inter-ministerial interactions between
the ministries working on migration. There is often no singular ministry that is consid-
ered the lead ministry in migration matters. The slow progress of the drafting of the
Senegalese NMP, which began in July 2015 and was publicised in the Senegalese media
as having been launched in March 2018, is in part attributed to a lack of communica-
tion.32 The NMP’s delayed production has been deplored by civil society actors who
raise the possibility of the document no longer being timely or relevant. The Ministry
of Finance has yet to obtain the necessary ‘political stamp’ of approval for the policy
from the overseeing inter-ministerial council, an indication that the policy remains in
political limbo.33
While there is no official key ministry or government agency that maintains an over-
sight of migration policy in Senegal, the DGSE emerges as a key interlocutor for several
external actors – and is perceived by these actors as the more appropriate coordinating
government body. An EU Delegation interviewee commented that while interactions
with Senegalese ministries followed thematic and technical lines, mirroring areas of
project interventions and dealing with the relevant ministry where appropriate, the
28Interviews at: Ministry of Employment and Labour Relations, Accra, 9 March 2018; Ministry of Interior,
Migration Unit, Accra, 23 February 2018; Ministry of Justice, Accra, 2 March 2018.
29Interview at CMS, University of Ghana, Accra, 20 February 2018.
30Interview at MAESE, Dakar, 2 November 2017.
31Notes from government-civil society stakeholder meeting, November 2017.
32Notes from government-civil society stakeholder meeting, November 2017.
33Personal e-mail communication, DDCH official, 3 October 2018.
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‘transversal interlocutor’ is the DGSE.34 The DGSE is seen to have a more comprehen-
sive and cross-cutting view on migration issues, given its focus on Senegalese abroad
and accordingly the matter of migrant returns, and the fact that migrant return remains
an objective common to all EU projects.35 The IOM in Dakar has equally called on the
DGSE to take the lead in organising inter-organisational consultations between both
state and external actors working on migration policy and projects in Senegal.36
This lack of inter-ministerial communication is highlighted by both external and
internal actors. An interviewee from the DDCH, in relation to the development of the
NMP, commented on the difficulties of promoting a consensual and common vision on
migration between government stakeholders; and the challenges that arise from each
ministry pursuing a migration agenda in relation to its own institutional priorities. This
was indicative of competition between ministries seeking to exert their influence. An
IOM interviewee in Dakar cited the following example: while MAESE lodged a
technical assistance request and commenced activities, it became apparent that the
project requested necessitated dealing with legal aspects that fall under the responsibil-
ity of the Ministry of Justice, whereas this ministry had so far been excluded from all
involvement in the project.37 With no process for formal consultation between the two
ministries existing, a meeting between the two ministries was thus set up externally by
the IOM to facilitate coordination.
Inter-ministerial competition and ad-hoc coordination is equally present in Ghana
and is noted by both internal and external actors. An interviewee at the EU Delegation
commented on the difficulties of getting ministries together, and of the competition
between the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the matter of
competence with regard to identification missions of Ghanaian nationals.38 The GIS
(under the Ministry of Interior) is tasked with accompanying MoFARI and consulate
officials on identification missions, but coordination issues have sparked tensions
between the two ministerial entities.39
The Ghanaian Ministry of Justice deals with legal aspects of migration policy and
advises other ministries on aspects of national and regional law that affect their
activities, including the signing of bilateral or international agreements. However, an
interviewee spoke of the apparent side-lining of the Attorney-General’s Office in migra-
tion matters pertaining to the ministry’s area of expertise. Even in cases where the
ministry was consulted, this would frequently only occur retroactively whereas earlier
consultations and advice-seeking could have circumvented difficulties that arose.
Capacity-building along ministerial lines
The tendency of the EU and EU Member States to pursue working relationships with
individual ministries has furthered the opportunities for ministries to reinforce their
mandates, bolster their own instititutional capacities in migration, and extend their
activities across different thematic areas. Project implementers have noted that the in-
crease in available migration programmes and funding has enabled ministries to
34Interview at EU Delegation, Dakar, 7 November 2017.
35Interview at EU Delegation, Dakar, 13 October 2017.
36Interview at IOM, Dakar, 17 October 2017.
37Interview (Skype) with IOM, Dakar, 11 December 2017.
38Interview at EU Delegation, Accra, 25 January 2018.
39Interview at EU Delegation, Accra, 25 January 2018.
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cherry-pick programmes according to their own preferences, choosing implementation
partners and programme frameworks accordingly. State actors of different countries
find that they can access a range of funding options for migration programmes.
Particularly West and Central African countries are presented with a ‘massive’ number
of initiatives from the EU, each representing particular political or regional perspec-
tives: in practice, individual countries have access to different possibilities whereby
‘knocking on the door of [an] action, if there is a refusal, they will go to another one’.40
In one instance, a migration technical assistance programme under the International
Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) received a request from the
Ghanaian Bureau of Diaspora Affairs (at the time under the Ghanaian MoFARI) to as-
sist in the formulation of a Diaspora Engagement Policy. The project was initiated but
as other international actors came into play, MoFARI opted to discontinue cooperation
with the ICMPD in favour of another partner organisation. In addition to apparent in-
creased funding, the proposed framework of the new partner organisation better suited
the Ghanaian MoFARI’s preferences, that preferred to outsource the drafting of the
policy to an external consultant rather than draft it internally (as the ICMPD project
would have required).41 These instances demonstrate how Senegalese and Ghanaian
political actors have capitalised on the proliferation of donor-funding for migration
programmes to pursue sectorial or structural preferences.
Organisational challenges
A final recurring theme is the challenge of staff turnover within government ministries.
This frequently results in the dismantling of inter-personal networks that further stunt
both inter-ministerial communication and communication with external actors. Staff
turnover and departmental reshuffling also entails the loss of expertise, as highlighted
earlier within Ghana’s Bureau of Diaspora Affairs. A key official of the Senegalese
MAESE who attended the EU’s Valletta Summit in late 2015 and who had been closely
involved in the EU-Senegal political dialogue on migration following Valletta, had since
relocated to South Africa for an embassy role.42 Project implementers also point to pol-
itical commitment to a project or initiative being seen to disappear when civil service
staff in the Ghanaian ministries move to a different role.43 In another case, the depart-
ure of a senior official from the Migration Information Centre of the Ghanaian
Ministry of Interior resulted in the loss of progress in inter-ministerial communication,
with the disappearance of a key facilitator.44 In many instances it is through externally-
facilitated meetings or workshops, such as those organised by the EU or the IOM, that
inter-ministerial interaction on migration takes place.
Conclusion
This paper has set out to map the preferences and resulting strategies of policy actors
in West Africa in response to the EU’s external migration agenda, taking as a focal
point the domestic conditions under which these actors operate. Throughout this paper
40Interview at IOM, Brussels, 27 September 2017.
41Interview at ICMPD, Brussels, 22 September 2017.
42Interview at DGSE, Dakar, 17 October 2017.
43Interview at ICMPD, Brussels, 22 September 2017.
44Interview at Ministry of Justice, Accra, 2 March 2018.
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I have argued that preference formation among domestic state actors in countries at
the receiving end of the EU’s migration policy proposals needs to be unpacked, given
that state actors respond to domestic considerations in equal or in greater part than
they respond to external incentives offered by the EU. This article has therefore taken
as a starting point the need to look beyond the limits of EU external governance in
explanations of migration policy cooperation outcomes with West African countries –
which has traditionally looked at constraints on EU institutional and political power as
a source of empowerment for third countries in negotiations – and examine instead
the intricacies of preference formation among African state actors as shaped by domes-
tic institutions. Looking at cooperation on the topic of returns, this paper has identified
the key contentions among domestic actors, which differed to some extent between
Ghanaian and Senegalese policymakers. It also identified some of the institutional
constraints they operate under, and the varying mechanisms used to act on policy pref-
erences. Public opinion emerges as a strong constraining factor, where the role of the
diaspora in shaping and constraining policymakers’ responses to the EU’s external
migration agenda is touched upon in this article but could form an avenue for further
research.
At the same time, this article has demonstrated that the outcome of policy formation
and cooperation in the case studies is impacted by coordination issues and competition
between political actors, who also seek to increase their institutional capacities,
reinforce their mandate, and maintain or extend their competencies in migration
policy. Cooperation outcomes and policies, even when formally agreed upon, are
subject to domestic political or organisational shifts that can cause a top-down repriori-
tisation of policy aims and interests, a shelving of previously approved policies, or a
change of actors – which are factors shown to have an impact on cooperation
dynamics. Party politics, public opinion, the political and economic clout of the dias-
pora as well as organisational realities such as a high rate of staff turnover within
Senegalese and Ghanaian ministries are thus shown to influence cooperation outcomes.
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